Thailand Deepens Military Ties with China
On May 22, 2025, senior military officials from China and Thailand reached an “important consensus” to enhance strategic cooperation, following talks in Beijing between General Liu Zhenli (People’s Liberation Army) and General Songwit Noonpackdee (Royal Thai Armed Forces). The agreement builds on existing military ties, including recent Falcon Strike and Blue Strike joint exercises, and could lead to expanded training programs, strategic communication, and additional arms procurement.
This development occurs within the framework of the U.S.-Thailand defense alliance, rooted in the 1954 Manila Pact and the 1962 Thanat–Rusk communiqué. While Thailand remains a treaty ally of the United States and continues to host the annual Cobra Gold exercises, its increasing defense engagement with China reflects a shift toward a hedging strategy—maximizing benefits from both powers without exclusive alignment. As of now, Washington has issued no formal response, though U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is expected to address regional shifts—including China’s military outreach—at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore later this month.
This agreement is a concrete step and reinforces China’s growing military and political presence in mainland Southeast Asia, while testing the operational relevance and strategic exclusivity of U.S. security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. For Thailand, it reflects tactical flexibility, but also increases complexity in managing long-term defense interoperability and diplomatic credibility with its U.S. and ASEAN partners.
Forecast Scenario:
Base Case (65%): Thailand continues to hedge between China and the U.S., expanding structured defense ties with Beijing while maintaining its U.S. treaty obligations. Joint exercises with both powers persist, but procurement and industrial integration increasingly lean toward China. The alliance with Washington remains intact but less operationally influential.
Upside Case (20%): Thailand successfully leverages its dual-alignment to maximize defense and economic benefits. It attracts joint ventures from both China and the U.S., enhances regional diplomatic standing, and positions itself as a credible intermediary within ASEAN on security and economic matters.
Downside Case (15%): Strategic ambiguity leads to distrust. The U.S. restricts technology transfers and limits military engagement, while China becomes Thailand’s primary security partner. This accelerates dependency on Chinese systems, weakens U.S. presence in mainland Southeast Asia, and contributes to ASEAN fragmentation.
