Mali’s Security Crisis
Mali is facing a steadily worsening security crisis marked by the erosion of state control in key regions and the intensification of jihadist violence. The coordinated June 2025 attacks on military positions in Boulkessi and Timbuktu, attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), reflect a deliberate shift in insurgent strategy toward high-impact targets. These assaults follow a broader trend: over 400 soldiers have been killed across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in the past month alone.
Despite the Malian junta’s ongoing partnership with Russia’s Wagner Group—tasked with bolstering counterinsurgency operations since the departure of French and UN forces—the security trajectory continues to decline. Wagner forces have been deployed in both urban and rural combat zones, but their involvement has not delivered durable gains. In regions like Timbuktu, jihadist groups have imposed mobility restrictions, shelled infrastructure, and disrupted civilian life, displacing over 33,000 people since August 2023.
Politically, Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS and its alignment with Burkina Faso and Niger through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has further constrained external engagement. Without a credible political roadmap or effective regional security coordination, the Malian government faces a long-term challenge in reasserting state authority across the north and center.
Base Case – Slow Deterioration with Regional Containment (60%)
In this scenario, Mali continues to lose operational control over large portions of its central and northern regions. Jihadist groups such as JNIM entrench themselves further, exerting influence over key corridors around Timbuktu, Mopti, and Gao. While the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) enables limited joint military operations with Burkina Faso and Niger, coordination remains under-resourced and reactive. The Malian junta, with support from Wagner Group elements, holds strategic southern zones including Bamako, Sikasso, and key mining routes. Governance remains militarized with no electoral roadmap, and the population continues to suffer from restricted services and insecurity. International isolation persists, with aid limited to emergency humanitarian flows. The risk in this baseline is the gradual normalization of parallel authorities under jihadist control, undermining the state’s long-term legitimacy.
Upside Case – Tactical Stabilization with Conditional Re-engagement (20%)
In the most optimistic near-term outlook, the junta, facing mounting pressure from internal actors and AES allies, agrees to a phased political transition plan. This includes limited decentralization and conditional international re-engagement mediated by neutral regional actors such as Algeria or Mauritania. Targeted security gains are achieved in key urban centers like Timbuktu and Djenné through a combination of local reconciliation, improved military coordination, and scaled-back Wagner involvement focusing on training and logistics. Basic services begin to return in semi-secured areas, and early municipal elections are piloted in the south. Though fragile, this scenario offers the prospect of partially rebuilding state legitimacy and reversing some security trends. However, these improvements remain heavily contingent on external support and domestic political compromise.
Downside Case – Strategic Collapse and Regional Spillover (20%)
In the worst-case scenario, a major military loss—such as the fall of Gao or the complete rout of forces in Mopti—leads to widespread troop withdrawals and desertions. Insurgent groups capitalize on the vacuum, expanding their control over transport corridors, airstrips, and key border towns. Wagner forces are either withdrawn due to overstretch or reassigned amid shifting Russian priorities elsewhere. The junta’s control is effectively reduced to Bamako and parts of the south, while the north and center become ungoverned or governed by jihadist structures. This situation triggers massive civilian displacement and destabilizes neighboring states like Mauritania, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire. Refugee flows increase, cross-border raids escalate, and the AES alliance proves unable to contain the crisis. The broader Sahel edges toward becoming a contiguous conflict zone with regional and international implications.
