EU Parliament Advances No-Confidence Vote Against Von der Leyen
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen faces mounting political pressure over the “Pfizergate” scandal, a controversy involving undisclosed text messages exchanged with Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla during the negotiation of one of the EU’s largest COVID-19 vaccine contracts. In May 2025, the EU’s General Court ruled that the European Commission violated transparency laws by refusing to disclose these communications, declaring them official documents under EU access regulations. The texts, reportedly used to negotiate a €35 billion deal for up to 900 million vaccine doses, have become a flashpoint in the EU’s ongoing debate over executive accountability and digital record-keeping.
In response, a coalition of far-right, green, and socialist MEPs launched a motion of no confidence against von der Leyen. While the motion is unlikely to pass—requiring a two-thirds supermajority in the 720-seat European Parliament—it significantly undermines her authority ahead of a potential bid for a second term. The case has broader implications for transparency, digital governance, and EU institutional norms, exposing vulnerabilities in how informal communications are handled during high-stakes decision-making. As political tensions rise in Brussels, the scandal is reshaping the EU's internal power balance and prompting calls for systemic reform.
Base Case: Narrow Survival with Political Concessions (70% Likelihood)
In the most likely scenario, Ursula von der Leyen survives the no-confidence vote, but by a reduced and politically costly margin. Her centrist European People's Party (EPP) retains enough support from the Renew Europe and Socialist & Democrats (S&D) blocs to defeat the motion. However, the vote reveals significant internal dissent—particularly from the Greens and disaffected left-leaning MEPs—which forces von der Leyen to make immediate policy concessions.
To stabilize her leadership, she offers procedural reforms to increase transparency in Commission dealings, agrees to more robust parliamentary oversight mechanisms, and reintroduces or strengthens stalled legislation such as green transition and anti-corruption packages. While she remains Commission President, her political capital is diminished, and her ability to push bold initiatives weakens. The remainder of her term is defined by cautious consensus-building and recalibrated legislative priorities shaped more heavily by Parliament.
This scenario aligns with historical precedent, as no Commission has ever been removed by a confidence vote—though near-misses have left long political shadows.
Upside Case: Vote Strengthens Leadership and Clears Path for Second Term (20% Likelihood)
In the best-case outcome for von der Leyen, the no-confidence vote is decisively defeated, with a broad coalition—including moderate Socialists, Liberals, and even some Greens—rallying behind her. The margin of defeat for the motion is wide enough to be read as an endorsement of her leadership and a rejection of populist or extremist attempts to destabilize EU governance.
This unexpected show of strength revitalizes her prospects for a second term as Commission President, potentially securing early backing from key national leaders like Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz. With a reinforced mandate, she accelerates legislation on strategic autonomy, climate investment, and digital sovereignty. Investor confidence returns swiftly, and intra-EU power centers consolidate around a reinvigorated Commission.
This scenario becomes more plausible if last-minute negotiations succeed in isolating far-right sponsors of the motion and framing the vote as a referendum on democratic norms, not just executive conduct.
Downside Case: Vote Narrowly Fails, Triggering Leadership Crisis (10% Likelihood)
In the worst-case scenario, the no-confidence motion fails but with a dangerously narrow margin—fewer than 40 votes. The vote exposes deep fractures within the governing coalition and emboldens internal critics, raising questions about von der Leyen’s capacity to lead a stable Commission through the remainder of her term.
In response, key political groups may begin floating alternative candidates for 2026, triggering informal leadership jockeying. Von der Leyen enters a “lame duck” phase, with legislative momentum grinding to a halt. The Parliament gains new leverage, frequently blocking or amending Commission proposals. Member states may become more assertive, bypassing Brussels with intergovernmental deals on energy, security, and migration.
Investor sentiment weakens as institutional uncertainty looms. Regulatory processes slow, and broader European integration projects—such as banking union or defense coordination—stall amid political drift. In this scenario, von der Leyen finishes her term severely weakened, and her leadership becomes emblematic of post-pandemic institutional fatigue.
