Donald Trump Attempts to Keep Pakistan out of Israel-Iran Conflict
On June 18, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump will host Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, for a private lunch at the White House—marking the most direct U.S. overture toward Pakistan’s military leadership in years. The meeting comes at a moment of extreme regional volatility, with Iran and Israel engaged in sustained airstrike and missile exchanges, and U.S. officials seeking to prevent escalation into a broader Middle Eastern war.
The core objective behind the Trump–Munir meeting is clear: to discourage Pakistan from aligning with Iran—either militarily, diplomatically, or economically—as Tehran’s regional position hardens under fire. However, Pakistan’s strategic posture is shaped less by Iran and more by China, which remains its primary economic patron. Pakistan imports US $20.2 billion in Chinese goods annually, owes US $77.5 billion in debt—much of it to Chinese lenders—and hosts US $62 billion in infrastructure through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Any meaningful shift in Islamabad’s alignment would require navigating this deeply embedded Chinese influence.
In contrast, Pakistan’s exposure to Iran is modest: about US $1.2 billion in trade, largely through barter arrangements to skirt sanctions. Yet political and religious ties with Tehran endure, and the U.S. move appears aimed at preempting any symbolic or material support to Iran amid ongoing hostilities. And in India, the political opposition has demanded strategic clarity. The Congress Party warned that renewed U.S.–Pakistan engagement could dilute New Delhi’s regional leverage.
Base Case: Tactical Realignment Without Structural Shift (60%)
In the most likely scenario, the Trump–Munir meeting results in modest diplomatic gains for both sides, but stops short of a structural reorientation. The U.S. may secure Pakistan’s informal commitment to remain neutral in the Iran–Israel conflict, limiting intelligence sharing with Tehran and avoiding rhetorical alignment. In return, Washington could reopen limited security cooperation, possibly on IS-K surveillance or regional logistics. However, Pakistan remains economically tethered to China, with CPEC projects ongoing and debt rollovers continuing. Islamabad uses this renewed U.S. engagement to rebalance between major powers without making hard commitments.
Upside Case: Strategic Rebalancing Toward the U.S. (20%)
In a more favorable outcome for Washington, Pakistan begins to distance itself from both Iran and China. The U.S. leverages IMF negotiations and backchannel Gulf diplomacy to offer Islamabad financial and diplomatic incentives in exchange for greater alignment. This could include a freeze on Iran pipeline expansion, enhanced counterterrorism intelligence sharing, and openness to U.S. infrastructure audits within CPEC zones. While this would not break Pakistan–China ties, it would create meaningful diversification and restore U.S. influence in Islamabad. Such a pivot would elevate Pakistan’s role in U.S. Indo-Pacific calculus and constrain Tehran’s regional access.
Downside Case: Symbolic Meeting, Strategic Backlash (20%)
Alternatively, the meeting could backfire. If perceived as coercive or superficial, Pakistan may deepen reliance on China and reinforce ties with Iran as a hedge. Beijing could interpret U.S. outreach as a threat to its strategic corridor and accelerate integration of Gwadar into its naval architecture. Meanwhile, Iran could use the optics of U.S.–Pakistan rapprochement to justify deeper military coordination with Islamabad. India, sidelined diplomatically, could shift more aggressively toward Western defense pacts, accelerating regional polarization. The U.S. gains little, and the meeting becomes a lost opportunity in an increasingly fragmented strategic landscape.
