Canada's Big Tent G7 Diplomacy
Canada has extended invitations to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta (June 15–17), marking a calculated shift in the summit’s composition and Canada’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Mark Carney. Both nations are not members of the G7, but are central to several global dossiers that the summit aims to address—namely energy security, geopolitical conflict resolution, and critical supply chains.
India’s inclusion is diplomatically complex. Canada-India relations have been strained since the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia, which Canadian intelligence linked to Indian agents. Despite this, Carney has framed the invitation as a strategic necessity, citing India’s role as the world’s 5th-largest economy, its projected status as the most populous nation, and its relevance in Indo-Pacific security architecture and global green energy transition. The move is conditional; Indian cooperation on security investigations and bilateral engagement are expected in parallel.
Saudi Arabia’s participation underscores Ottawa’s recognition of the Kingdom’s evolving role—not only as an OPEC heavyweight but as an actor involved in Ukraine ceasefire discussions and post-Gaza reconstruction frameworks. Canada sees potential alignment with Riyadh’s Vision 2030 economic diversification, particularly in infrastructure financing, green hydrogen, and AI/data governance—areas where Canadian firms are actively seeking outbound opportunities.
Behind both invitations lies a targeted investment diplomacy strategy: diversifying Canadian trade and investment flows by deepening ties with India’s Reliance Industries, Tata Group, and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF). This strategy reflects Carney’s background in global finance and climate risk, aiming to position Canada as a bridge between G7 capital and Global South growth.
The move has drawn criticism from Sikh diaspora leaders and Amnesty International, raising questions about reconciling diplomatic outreach with human rights concerns.
Base Case – Limited Engagement, Stable Optics (55%)
In the most likely scenario, both India and Saudi Arabia attend the G7 Summit as special invitees and participate in working sessions focused on energy markets, critical minerals, climate finance, and engagement with the Global South. The tone remains formal but cautious. India offers limited cooperation with Canadian law enforcement on diaspora security issues, possibly via backchannel or third-party coordination. While no major breakthroughs occur, diplomatic hostilities ease slightly, allowing for resumption of low‑level bilateral dialogue.
Public backlash in Canada—particularly from Sikh diaspora groups—remains active but contained. Human rights NGOs criticize the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, but the summit avoids major reputational damage. This scenario sees no permanent G7+ framework emerging, but also avoids breakdowns. Canada successfully positions itself as a “bridge” state without overcommitting diplomatically or domestically.
Upside Case – Strategic Re-alignment and Trade Acceleration (25%)
In this more optimistic outcome, the G7 leverages the summit to launch a permanent or recurring "G7+" working group format, with India and Saudi Arabia joining collaborative tracks on supply chain resilience, infrastructure co-financing, and green energy transition. India and Canada resume suspended trade negotiations, and Canada finalizes new memoranda of understanding with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) focused on hydrogen, AI infrastructure, and digital economy cooperation.
Diplomatic normalization accelerates. India discreetly provides key cooperation on law enforcement matters, helping deescalate tensions over the Nijjar assassination case. Simultaneously, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman uses the G7 platform to position Saudi Arabia as a constructive intermediary in both Ukraine diplomacy and Middle East stabilization efforts. For Canada, this results in stronger bilateral trade routes, greater foreign direct investment inflows, and enhanced global positioning.
Downside Case – Backlash and Breakdown (20%)
In the worst-case outcome, Canada’s invitation strategy backfires. India’s G7 presence coincides with new disclosures about the Nijjar case, reigniting diaspora anger and triggering protests across major Canadian cities. The Sikh community and opposition parties criticize the government for legitimizing a regime they accuse of extraterritorial violence. Saudi Arabia faces similar pushback after domestic rights abuses draw renewed international condemnation during the summit window.
Diplomatic fallout ensues: India may walk back cooperation or publicly rebuke Canada, while Saudi Arabia refrains from signing expected green energy or tech agreements. No meaningful G7 communique includes these nations in long-term collaboration frameworks. Canada is criticized for engaging in “transactional diplomacy” and sacrificing its values for strategic access. Investor sentiment sours slightly, especially in ESG-aligned sectors, and foreign policy credibility takes a hit.
